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DO CHURCHES MATTER? TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
RIcHARD W. GARNErr*
IN recent years, several prominent scholars have called attention to the
importance of the "various 'First Amendment institutions"' that "play a
significant role in contributing to public discourse[.]" 1 There is a growing
body of work informed by an appreciation for what Professor Balkin calls
the "infrastructure of free expression." 2 The freedom of expression, he
suggests, requires "more than mere absence of government censorship or
prohibition to thrive; [it] also require[s] institutions, practices and tech-
* John Cardinal O'Hara, C.S.C. Associate Professor of Law, University of
Notre Dame. An earlier version of this essay was presented on March 21, 2007, at
the Villanova University School of Law, as the annual Gianella Lecture. I am
deeply grateful to Dean Mark Sargent for the honor of delivering this lecture and
for his leadership in the important project of engaged, distinctively Catholic legal
education and scholarship. I appreciate also the thoughtful, helpful questions and
comments I received about my lecture from Villanova students and faculty,
including Michael Moreland, Robert Miller, Kathy Brady and Patrick Brennan.
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Paolo Carozza, Bob Rodes, John Coughlin, Paul Horwitz,
Eduardo Penalver, Kyle Duncan, Steve Shiffrin, Steve Smith, A.J. Bellia and Nelson
Tebbe were also generous with their time and suggestions for the essay.
1. See Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy An-
swers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1497, 1497 (2007) (noting importance
of First Amendment institutions).
2. SeeJack M. Balkin, Address at the Second Access to Knowledge Conference
at Yale University: Two Ideas for Access to Knowledge: The Infrastructure of Free
Expression and Margins of Appreciation (Apr. 27, 2007) (transcript available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/two-ideas-for-access-to-knowledge.html)
(noting that freedom of speech rests on infrastructure of free expression). Prof.
Balkin observed:
What is in that infrastructure? It includes government policies that pro-
mote the creation and delivery of information and knowledge. It con-
cerns government policies that promote transparency and sharing of
government created knowledge and data. It involves government and pri-
vate sector investments in information provision and technology, includ-
ing telephones, telegraphs, libraries, and Internet access. It includes
policies like subsidies for postal delivery, education, and even the build-
ing of schools.
Id.
(273)
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nological structures that foster and promote [it]."3 The intuition animat-
ing this scholarship, then, is that the freedom of expression is not only
enjoyed by and through, but also depends on the existence and flourish-
ing of, certain institutions-newspapers, political parties, interest groups,
libraries, expressive associations, universities and so on. These "First
Amendment institutions" are free-speech actors, but they also play a struc-
tural-or, again, an "infrastructural"- role in clearing out and protecting
the civil-society space within which the freedom of speech can be well ex-
ercised. These institutions are "not only conduits for expression," they are
also "the scaffolding around which civil society is constructed, in which
personal freedoms are exercised, in which loyalties are formed and trans-
mitted, and in which individuals flourish." 4
Similar "infrastructural" claims can and should be proposed with re-
spect to the freedom of religion. Like the freedom of speech, religious
freedom has and requires an infrastructure. Like free expression, it is not
exercised only by individuals; like free expression, its exercise requires
more than an individual with something to say; like free expression, it in-
volves more than protecting a solitary conscience. The freedom of relig-
ion is not only lived and experienced through institutions, it is also
protected and nourished by them. Accordingly, the theories and doc-
trines we use to understand, apply and enforce the First Amendment's
religious-freedom provisions should reflect and respect this fact. If we
want to understand well the content and implications of our constitutional
commitment to religious liberty, we need to ask, as Professors Lupu and
Tuttle have put it, whether "religious entities occupy a distinctive place in
our constitutional order[.]" 5
I.
We lawyers live in a made-up world. This is not to say that lawyers are
demiurges, deities or delusional. It is only to observe that lawyers deal
primarily with things and tools that lawyers and "the law" create. Our
made-up world is our made-up world; it is both inhabited and constructed
by us. "[A] lawyer," Professor Finnis has written, "sees the desired future
social order from a professionally structured viewpoint, as a stylized and
manageable drama."6 Appreciating this fact should push us to ask how
well we have made it, what we have made it for and what its relationship is
to the world inhabited by regular people.
Think about it: Regular people experience car accidents in which
they are injured, and which cause them pain and cost them money. Law-
3. Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2007/05/infrastructure-of-religious-freedom.html (Apr. 30, 2007, 8:59 EST).
4. Richard W. Garnett, The Stoy of Heny Adams's Soul: Education and the Expres-
sion of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841, 1854 (2001).
5. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in
Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. Rrv. 37, 92 (2002).
6. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 282-83 (1980).
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yers, on the other hand, inhabit a world of "torts," an element of which is
often "negligence," which may give rise to "liability" for "damages." Regu-
lar people chuckle-they probably think of Ferris Bueller, not Felix Frank-
furter 7-when they read about blockbuster free-speech cases involving
high-school smart-alecks who get on television, and torment their princi-
pal, by waving "Bong Hits 4Jesus" signs at an Olympic Torch parade. 8 For
lawyers, though, the relevant players in stories like this are terms and con-
cepts like "state actors," "viewpoint neutrality" and "Tinker balancing."
Regular people do not encounter or experience "mens rea"; they do not
pass their afternoons in a "designated public forum"; and they have never
met-unless they ride the Clapham Omnibus9 -the "reasonable man."
The lawyer's world, however, is thick with these and similar places, persons
and things; they are our raw materials, our stock-in-trade. A medical doc-
tor works with bodies, a farmer with dirt, seeds and weather. They deal
with things that are given, not made, and that are independent of and
prior to the work of doctors and farmers. A lawyer, though, reaches such
real things only indirectly, through categories, abstractions and doctrines.
For us, as Clifford Geertz once put it, law is "part of a distinctive manner of
imagining the real."10
This was, I take it, one of Holmes's points in The Path of the Law. He
wrote:
There is a story of a Vermont justice of the peace before whom a
suit was brought by one farmer against another for breaking a
churn. The justice took time to consider, and then said that he
had looked through the statutes and could find nothing about
churns, and gave judgment for the defendant.II
The country jurist's mistake, Holmes thought, was not so much that he
had misperceived an object in the real world. 12 He did not mistake, say, a
cow for a churn. It was, instead, that he had forgotten to do what law
7. Justice Frankfurter's understanding of the mission, nature and accomplish-
ments of public education can, it seems safe to say, be contrasted with those pro-
moted in the film classic, FERRIS BUELLER'S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986).
See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203,
212-32 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
8. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (describing First Amend-
ment case regarding display of "BONG HiTS 4JESUS" banner at school function).
For an extended discussion of Morse, see, for example, Richard W. Garnett, Can
There Really Be "Free Speech" in Public Schools?, 12 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 45 (2008).
9. See, e.g., McQuire v. W. Morning News Co., (1903) 2 K.B. 100, 109 (describ-
ing "ordinary reasonable man" as "the man on the Clapham omnibus").
10. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in
GEERTZ, LocAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167,
170 (1983).
11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 H-Lv. L. REv. 991, 1006
(1997).
12. See id. (discussing problematic nature of jurist's limited analysis of case
law).
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students are told and trained to do, namely, to "think like a lawyer," to
think not about cows and churns but about rights and remedies, claims
and doctrines.
13
Now, Holmes thought-and we can agree-that the legal enterprise
is better able to do what we want it to do, and what it is for, when it em-
ploys and addresses legal categories, and the distinctions between and
among them, rather than the unformed stuff of real-world, everyday, pre-
legal life.1 4 If Lon Fuller was right, and "law" involves subjecting human
conduct to the governance of general rules for the purpose of achieving
and maintaining social order, 15 then it seems reasonable to think that this
project will be helped by constructs and classifications that sort, organize
and in many cases ignore the real world's messy particulars.
But what if lawyers' categories are somehow "off'? What if the law
remakes, for its own purposes, the world in a way that does not accurately
convert our pre-legal experience and environment into lawyer-ready tools
and abstractions? What if, instead, it distorts that experience? What if it
passes over or leaves out something that matters? What if something im-
portant and valuable is lost in translation? True, lawyers' abstractions are
not actually in or presented by the real world. (We lawyers need not be
Platonists.) Still, we want them to at least point in the real world's general
direction. Similarly, and more specifically, when it comes to our Constitu-
tion, we should want our doctrines, on the one hand, to implement the
text in a way that is faithful to its meaning-that is, to its binding con-
tent 16 -and, on the other, to capture no less faithfully what is significant,
and what really matters, about the real world that the text governs and to
which it speaks.
II.
About a decade ago, one of the legal academy's most distinguished
scholars suggested that the rules and categories used to enforce the First
13. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARv. L. REv. 84, 110 (1998) (noting "the preference for generality" that is "part
of the legal craft" and one feature of "think[ing] like a lawyer").
14. See id. at 108. Schauer observed that Holmes believed that
law did, and should, divide the world into legal categories like contract,
negligence, estoppel, strict liability, equity, and possession, and not into
pre-legal or extra-legal categories like railroads, telegraphs, churns, and
Cleveland. Only by identifying the proper legal category, Holmes ap-
pears to have thought, could the purposes of law be achieved and legal
outcomes correctly predicted.
Id.
15. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 5-6 (1964) (discussing general
history of legal principles in society).
16. For (just) one discussion of constitutional "legitimacy," of the Constitu-
tion's meaning, and of why the Constitution's meaning binds, see generally, RANDY
E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
(2004).
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Amendment's Free Speech Clause were failing to meet our expectations.
17
While not quibbling with the "prescriptive merits of designing law around
juridical categories," Professor Schauer raised the possibility that the legal
tools being used to protect the freedom of speech and implement the First
Amendment were missing something important about the real world of
speech and speakers.18 He observed that free-speech law-understanda-
bly, and appropriately-reflects our desire to prevent would-be speech
regulators from singling out unpopular people and arguments for unfa-
vorable treatment.)9 Because we worry about the temptation to censor
that to which we object, we discipline ourselves, like Odysseus lashing him-
self to the mast,20 and "ignor[e] what might otherwise appear to be politi-
cally and morally relevant features of speakers and speeches[.]" 2 1
In particular, Professor Schauer claimed, we tend to ignore institu-
tions.2 2 Free-speech law, he contended, "has been persistently reluctant to
develop its principles in an institution-specific manner, and thus to take
account of the cultural, political and economic differences among the dif-
ferentiated institutions that together comprise a society." 23 By and large
(and understandably, given the relevant text), we focus on "speech"-on
its content, purpose and viewpoint-and not on its institutional context,
origin or effects. In the real, pre-legal world, however, "speech" happens
in, through and by institutions. These institutions vary, and their differ-
ences matter. To ignore these institutions and differences may well spare
us the ridicule that Holmes heaped on the Vermont judge in the case of
the churn, but it still risks distorting both the world that the First Amend-
17. SeeSchauer, supranote 13, at 118 (offering criticism of First Amendment).
18. See id. (suggesting potential alternative approaches to First Amendment
doctrine).
19. See id. (analyzing First Amendment doctrine); see also Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[G]ovemments might soon seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular
views."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) ("[C]onstitutional
protection does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas
and beliefs which are offered."' (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445
(1963))).
20. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY
AND IRRATIONALITY (1984); Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Ex-
perimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 499 (1996) (discussing
"self-paternalism," Odysseus and the Sirens, and constitutionalism).
21. Schauer, supra note 13, at 85; see alsoJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NAT-
URAL RIGHTS 283 (1980).
In this drama, many characters, situations, and actions known to common
sense, sociology, and ethics are missing, while many other characters and
relationships known only or originally only to the lawyer are intro-
duced .... The existence of the legal rendering of the social order makes
a new train of practical reasoning possible, and necessary, for the law-
abiding private citizen[.]
Id. at 283.
22. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 84 (explaining "American free speech doc-
trine has never been comfortable distinguishing among institutions").
23. Id. at 84.
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ment is supposed to govern and the values which that governing is sup-
posed to reflect and respect.
What should we make of Professor Schauer's diagnosis? Start with the
basics: Our Constitution does not permit governments to "abridge" the
"freedom of speech."2 4 What does this command mean? How do we oper-
ationalize that meaning in the real world and enforce it in actual cases?
What is going to count as "abridg[ing]," or as "speech"? Is the "freedom
of speech" the same thing as "the desire to talk," "the ability to utter," or
the "compulsion to express oneself'? Does it include the right to receive
information, 25 the fight to refuse to speak, 26 or the right to associate ex-
pressively with others?2 7 Is it better thought of in terms of a negative con-
straint on government regulation or as a positive charge to government?28
To answer these and so many other questions, and to put the Free Speech
Clause's guarantee to work, we need doctrines and rules, categories and
abstractions, boundaries and definitions.
So, how and with what should we construct our free-speech tools?
There are some categories and distinctions that we could but do not draw,
because they seem inconsistent with the values that animate the text we
are trying to implement. For example, we could, but do not, distinguish
in free-speech cases and doctrine between "speech by women" and
"speech by men," or between "speech by liberals" and "speech by conserva-
tives." 29 Such categories would be unhelpful constitutional tools, because
their use would be inconsistent with the assigned constitutional tasks and
their premises would be at odds with the relevant constitutional values.
Nor have we bothered drawing lines, for case-deciding purposes, between
24. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech[.1"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The First Amendment does not
regulate or constrain directly the decisions or conduct of non-state actors. See, e.g.,
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
("Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amend-
ment scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not.").
25. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established
that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.").
26. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) ("The First
Amendment generally protects the right not to speak as well as the right to
speak.").
27. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[W]e have long
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.").
28. Compare, e.g., Lilian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense
of Categories, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 81 (1992) (suggesting applicable Supreme
Court precedent aims to reduce "public forum regulators [from] abus[ing] their
governmental power"), with, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3-4
(1996) (discussing instances where government is under positive charge to regu-
late speech).
29. Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992) ("We cannot think
of any First Amendment interest that would stand in the way of a State's prohibit-
ing only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses.").
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"speech on Wednesdays" and "speech on Tuesdays," or between "speech
in Times New Roman" and "speech in Courier." Lines like these are easy
to employ, but they miss the point and do not move the ball. They make
significant what is not; what they capture does not matter.
So, what free-speech categories have we drawn? A few examples: We
have, for starters, categorized carefully the public property where private
speech takes place.30 As a rule, the government is going to have more
room to regulate what goes on in public-that is, publicly owned-places
than to regulate what people say and do in private. 3 1 The First Amend-
ment, however, complicates things. In order to vindicate the "freedom of
speech," and to put the Free Speech Clause to work, we have distinguished
the "traditional public forum" from the "designated public forum" and the
"non-public forum."32 When resolving disputes involving the regulation
of private expression on public property, or private speakers' access to
public spaces, we place the space and property in the appropriate box.
We hope we do so in a way that is consistent with the value judgments and
other considerations that led to the creation of the categories in the first
place. Then, we apply the category-appropriate rules that constrain the
government's ability to act with respect to speech in the kind or category
of space at issue. In other words, we first categorize the spaces and then
proceed to one balancing test or another to evaluate the regulation.
Another example: We distinguish protected "speech" from categories
of expression that we think the First Amendment need not reach and that
the "freedom of speech" need not include.33 Some speech, in the land of
constitutional lawyers, isn't really, or at least is not regarded and protected
as, "speech." 34 We have identified a number of categories of such non-
30. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992); Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830, 831
(1992) (considering application of First Amendment in designated public fo-
rums). See generally, Richard W. Garnett, Less Is More:Justice Rehnquist, the Freedom of
Speech, and Democracy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 26 (Craig M. Braley ed., 2006);
Bevier, supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678 (explaining "it is ... well settled
that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns
and controls").
32. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (dis-
cussing potential First Amendment concerns at stake in regulation of internet ac-
cess in public libraries); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106
(2001) (discussing potential First Amendment concerns at stake in regulation of
use of school district facilities); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 830 (1985) (discussing potential First Amendment concerns at stake in
university's discretion to prohibit religious groups' access to university facilities).
33. See generally Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 273 (1981) ("When we define the word 'speech,'
we are categorizing."); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York
v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285 (1982); William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of
the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REv. 107 (1982).
34. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-83 (1957) (determining
obscenity to fall outside scope of protected First Amendment interests); Chaplin-
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speech "speech"-"defamation," "threats," and "incitement," for exam-
ple-and defined their boundaries in a way that is, we hope, consistent
with the First Amendment's meaning and with the commitments that
caused us to decide that the category being defined need not be consid-
ered "speech."35
An intuition underlying this categorization is something like "less is
more" (or, maybe, "more is less"); 36 that is, courts understand that the
extent to which the Constitution can meaningfully protect "the freedom
of speech" increases as the reach, or content, of the protected activity de-
creases. 37 "[T]he more that 'free speech' purports to mean," in other
words, "the less meaningful the protections that free-speech rights can
provide. The more work we ask the freedom of speech to do, the less
energetically and successfully it will be able to do it."3 8 The crucial ques-
tion, though, is whether the categories upon which we settle for the pur-
pose of confining "speech" to a manageable, protectable activity capture
what it is we are trying to protect; it is, again, whether our law-world cate-
gories accurately capture and translate the significance and value of the
real-world activity.
39
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (determining action of insult-
ing police officer to fall outside scope of protected First Amendment interests).
35. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Refer-
ence to Pornography, Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18 (1992) (noting
that "[o]bscenity does not count as speech"); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the
First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 615 n.146 (1986) (noting that modern Court
classifies obscenity as "not being speech at all"). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("Such statements must be taken in context, however,
and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand charac-
terizing obscenity 'as not being speech at all[.]").
36. See Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REv. 835, 837 (2004) (asking
"general question ... whether the definition of any right can be expanded without
risking access to the right"); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L. J. 624, 654-55 n.140 (1980) (noting "danger" of an excessively expansive
understanding of the First Amendment's reach).
37. Something like this observation seems to have animated Robert Bork's
controversial contention that "[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded only
to speech that is explicitly political." Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). After all, he argued, "[g]overn-
ment cannot function if anyone can say anything anywhere at any time." Id. at 21.
38. Garnett, supra note 30.
39. In a related vein, Professor Robert Post has argued that the "internal inco-
herence" of the Court's free-speech doctrine is due, at least in part, to the fact that
it has "imagined that the purpose of First Amendment jurisprudence is to protect
speech as such." Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1249, 1250 (1995). Post contends, though, that "the constitutional values ad-
vanced tojustify this protection inhere not in speech as such, but rather in particu-
lar social practices." Id. And, he continues, "First Amendment doctrine will
continue to flounder until it focuses clearly on the nature and constitutional signif-
icance of such practices." Id. at 1250-51. Post's suggestion that the categories em-
ployed in the free-speech context would better implement First Amendment
values, and the freedom of speech, well understood, if they were to focus less on
"speech as such" and more on "particular social practices" is, I think, consonant
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Many examples could be presented and discussed but, for present
purposes, no more are needed. Professor Schauer's point is that we
have-not entirely, certainly, but for the most part-avoided putting the
Free Speech Clause to work using doctrine that takes into account the
institutional character of the regulating agency, or the institutional con-
text or site for the speech, or the institutional character or status of the
speaker, or the importance of the speech at issue to the role an institution
plays in the structure of civil society.
Now, in many cases, we would not want the law to take institutional
variation into account. "True threats," for example, are not protected by
the First Amendment,40 and we probably do not think that "threats" issued
by newspapers, or political parties, or universities, or librarians should be
exempted from this rule. For the most part, the government's ability to
regulate speech does not depend on who (or what) the speaker is and,
again, there are good reasons for this. We worry that governments will
prefer popular speech and speakers over unpopular ones and soothing
messages over abrasive ones.
And so, we craft our categories and draw our distinctions in ways that,
we hope, neither tempt nor enable governments to silence the marginal,
the provocative or the revolutionary. Categories and classifications that
were institution-focused, we think, could open the door to favoritism and
special privilege. 4 1 In order to keep this door closed, we say that if the
advertisements of a candidate for president enjoy protection, then so do
those of a liquor store.4 2 If a citizen can be compelled to offer testimony,
then-so far as the Constitution goes, anyway4 3-so may a newspaper re-
with the suggestions advanced in this Essay regarding the freedom of religion. I
am grateful to Prof. Shiffrin for calling my attention to Post's argument.
40. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (stating "the First
Amendment ... permits a State to ban a 'true threat"').
41. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256, 1267-68 (2005). The author stated:
Perhaps because so many prominent First Amendment litigants have
been bad people with dangerous things to say, and perhaps because so
many others have at the very least existed on the fringes of social respect-
ability, there has always been a worry that an ad hoc First Amendment
would be especially vulnerable to excess constriction by judges and juries
too concerned with the moral or social undesirability of those who were
carrying the First Amendment claim.
Id.
42. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); cf Columbia
Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 201 (1973) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting) (complaining that "the favored treatment given 'commercial' speech
under the existing [regulatory] scheme [at issue] clearly reverses traditional First
Amendment priorities. For it has generally been understood that 'commercial'
speech enjoys less First Amendment protection than speech directed at the discus-
sion of controversial issues of public importance.")
43. At the time of this writing, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2007-
which would, among other things, create a federal "shield" for reporters-was
working its way through Congress. See Editorial, Act on the Shield Law, WASH. POST,
Oct. 28, 2007, at B6.
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porter. If an official charged with managing a public park must provide
viewpoint-neutral access to speakers, then so must an official charged with
administering a public university.44 And so on.
45
Of course, readers familiar with the fine points, intricate subtleties
and cringe-inducing anomalies of First Amendment doctrine understand
that much of what has been said so far is oversimplified. Sometimes, not-
withstanding the discussion above, our free-speech law is, in fact, institu-
tion-sensitive. Public schools and prisons can regulate otherwise-protected
speech in ways that city councils and state legislatures cannot.46 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has-sometimes without admitting it-decided
free-speech cases in ways that reflect sensitivity to the distinctive role of
institutions like public television stations,4 7 the National Endowment for
the Arts,48 the legal profession 49 and universities. 50 It has acknowledged
the contributions that "expressive" associations, such as the Boy Scouts,
make to the development of diverse and competing views and to the struc-
ture of a civil society in which the freedom of speech can flourish. 5 1 The
Court has suggested that newspapers and media corporations are, at least
44. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
229 (2000) ("The case we decide here ... does not raise the issue of the ... state-
controlled University's right ...to use its own funds to advance a particular
message.").
45. Professor Shiffrin, in correspondence, appropriately reminded me that, in
practice, the various paired cases just discussed are not, in fact, treated exactly the
same. That is, although it is true that commercial speech is increasingly protected,
it is still at least somewhat less protected than core political speech. Reporters are
treated more favorably by courts than are ordinary witnesses, even if this special
treatment is not required by the Constitution. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he courts will be available to
newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests re-
quire protection."). Still, I believe the examples suggest and illustrate the point,
i.e., that our doctrine avoids institution-specific categories, in part out of a desire
to avoid showing favoritism to certain speech or speakers.
46. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989) (observing regu-
lations of prisoners' speech are permissible if they are "reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests" (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)));
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) ("[T]he constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings."). See generally Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and
Prisoners-Oh My! A Cautionary Note about Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First
Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1635 (2007).
47. See generally Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1997).
48. See generally Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
49. See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
50. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) ("We have long recog-
nized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, uni-
versities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."). See generally Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Paul Horwitz,
Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 461 (2005).
51. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000). See generally
Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul, supra note 4.
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in some contexts, particularly important to First Amendment values, and
therefore may and should be treated particularly.
52
Nevertheless, Schauer's diagnosis of free-speech law seems on-target.
And, it raises the question whether our reluctance to incorporate institu-
tions and institutional differentiation more explicitly into First Amend-
ment doctrine causes us to miss or overlook something important about
the pre-legal world. In response to this question, as was noted earlier, a
number of scholars have taken up Schauer's invitation to re-think the "in-
stitutional agnosticism" that characterizes our Free Speech tools and cate-
gories. 53 Professor Paul Horwitz, for example, has suggested that
universities are "First Amendment institutions" whose special status and
function should be reflected in constitutional doctrine. 54 Professor
Roderick Hills has presented an "institutional" theory of rights that em-
phasizes the structural, power-dividing function of private associations. 5 5
David Fagundes has taken an "institutional rights" approach to the prob-
lem of speech by government entities and actors. 56 And, at a recent con-
ference, convened to explore the "role of institutional context in
constitutional law," 57 Schauer re-affirmed his view that there are "socially
important institutional distinctions" that constitutional law "systematically
ignores"; he suggested that recognizing and giving doctrinal effect to these
distinctions "might well serve important First Amendment values and pur-
poses" and again invited efforts to develop and defend institutional ap-
proaches and institution-specific categories.58 On the other hand,
Professor Scott Moss-while acknowledging the critique that First Amend-
ment doctrine is "institutionally oblivious"-has highlighted the dangers
52. SeeAustin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) ("Al-
though the press' unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protec-
tion under the Constitution ... it does provide a compelling reason for the State
to exempt media corporations from the scope of political expenditure limita-
tions."); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (emphasiz-
ing "function of editors" and noting that "[a] newspaper is more than a passive
receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising."); cf David A. Ander-
son, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REv. 429, 435 (2002) ("[T]he demise of the
press as a legally preferred institution is quite possible and perhaps even probable
.... "). See generally Paul Horwitz, Or of the [Blog], 11 NExus 45 (2006); Hon. Potter
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (discussing, among other
things, structural role played by free press in our constitutional democracy).
53. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 120.
54. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 1, at
1502. See generally Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 50.
55. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 144, 146 (2003).
56. See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1637, 1640, 1663 (2006).
57. See generally Symposium, Constitutional "Niches": The Role of Institutional
Context in Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. Rrv. 1497 (2007).
58. Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54
UCLA L. REv. 1747, 1750, 1755 (2007).
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that accompany "extreme institutional tailoring" in free-speech cases aris-
ing in prisons, workplaces and public schools. 59
We would do well to consider the force and implications of Professor
Schauer's diagnosis in the context of religious freedom. That is, it makes
sense to explore the possibility of an institution-sensitive approach to the
Religion Clauses and, more generally, to our thinking about the church-
state "nexus."60 Others have noted the possibility and promise of such an
approach but have not yet pursued it.6 1 A lot of work remains to be done.
Have courts and commentators, in fact, been "institutionally agnostic"
when it comes to religious-freedom doctrine? Have the categories and
doctrinal tools we use to frame Religion Clauses disputes and decide Relig-
ion Clauses cases missed, or mis-described, the role of institutions and in-
stitutional context?
III.
Certainly, these and similar questions cannot and so will not be an-
swered definitively here. Still, perhaps this Essay can make a start. Are
there institutions that play a special role in shoring up not only "public
discourse" generally, 62 but also, and more specifically, the freedom of re-
ligion? Do the relevant precedents, doctrines and theories capture this
role? Do they translate the reality of these institutions and their functions
into the law's "made-up world"? If they do not, could they? If our Relig-
ion Clauses' tools and categories are "institutional ly] agnostic[ ],"63 how
could this failing be remedied?
But first, it should be acknowledged and appreciated that our Relig-
ion Clauses doctrine is not, in fact, entirely "institutionally agnostic." We
can quickly note and move past the fact that, as in the free-speech con-
59. See Moss, supra note 46, at 1635.
60. See Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert
Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22J.L. & RELIGION 503, 512 (2006-2007) (contend-
ing that, when it comes to describing church-state problem, term "nexus" is prefer-
able to image of "wall," because former "suggests a relation, even a symbiosis,
between two distinct things-neither a collapse of one into the other nor a rigid
segregation of the one from the other.").
61. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 55, at 149, 161-63, 183-84, 189-90 (discussing
various theories of rights); Horwitz, Universities, supra note 1, at 1520-22; Schauer,
Institutions, supra note 58, at 1750 (exploring "socially important institutional dis-
tinctions" including religion, race and gender). Also, it has been argued
powerfully that the First Amendment's no-establishment rule should be thought of
as regulating the relations between the institutions of government and those of
religion and not as, for example, requiring a secularization of civil society or public
life generally. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing
the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955 (1989).
62. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming
2008) (noting that "religious institutions," like libraries, universities, etc., are "of
special importance to public discourse").
63. See Schauer, Principles, supra note 13, at 120.
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text,64 certain institutional settings like prisons and workplaces are treated
and governed differently. Consider, however, the extent to which relig-
ious-freedom precedents and constitutional arguments have been shaped
by courts' understanding of, and aspirations for, a particular institution,
that is, the government-run secondary or elementary school. For de-
cades-even centuries, perhaps 6 5-in case after case, brief after brief and
opinion column after opinion column, we have seen both the application
and the content of the Religion Clauses shaped by the perceived special
needs and aims of this institution. 66 Even putting aside the complicated
question of the place of anti-Catholicism in the Common School move-
ment,67 it is clear that many of the Court's landmark church-state cases
were shaped by the public-school institutional context.
For example, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis6S--the Court's ini-
tial, and later rejected, engagement with the flag-salute problem-the Jus-
tices seemed to subordinate the freedom of religion to the need to
"secur[e]," through public education, "effective loyalty to the traditional
ideals of democracy."69 Public schools, after all, have-as Professor Feld-
man puts it-"always been devoted to the inculcation of republican ide-
als." 70 This devotion is inseparable from the institution's identity, and
courts have, in a whole raft of Religion Clauses cases, run the Clauses'
commands through the filter of this identity. A few years after Gobitis, the
Court invalidated a release-time program in Champaign, Illinois. The pro-
gram allowed public-school children to leave regular classes for a short
time each week to receive the religious instruction, if any, their parents
desired. In invalidating it, the Court emphasized both the crucial role of
public schools in promoting civic unity and the allegedly divisive influence
64. For further discussion of the disparate treatment of organizations in First
Amendment context, see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854). The opinion noted:
Large masses of foreign population are among us, weak in the midst of
our strength. Mere citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the lib-
eral spirit of our laws and institutions, unless they become citizens in fact
as well as in name. In no other way can the process of assimilation be so
readily and thoroughly accomplished as through the medium of the pub-
lic schools ....
Id.
66. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REv.
1335, 1339 (2000) ("[T]he limitations on government support of religion are
more stringent within public schools than outside of them.").
67. See generally Richard W. Garnett, American Conversations with(in) Catholicism,
102 MICH. L. REv. 1191 (2004) (noting history of Common schools movement);
Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRsT AMEND. L. REv.
45 (2003) (describing anti-Catholic sentiments in nineteenth and early twentieth
century).
68. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled byW. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
69. 310 U.S. at 598.
70. NOAH FELDMAN, DMDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-
AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 151 (2005).
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of religion: "The public school," Justice Frankfurter wrote in a concurring
opinion, "is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it
more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools .... "71
Institutional characteristics have also been relevant in the Court's
cases involving public funding for education in religiously affiliated
schools and universities. Most obviously, courts have distinguished the en-
vironment and goals of religious primary and secondary schools from
those of religiously affiliated colleges and universities.72 Public funding
and assistance was-but no longer is 73-forbidden for the former institu-
tions, but permitted when directed toward the latter.7 4 And, religious
symbols and observances that, in a primary or secondary school, might
raise concerns about coercion or endorsement are less likely to be seen as
constitutionally problematic in the university setting.
75
True, it could be said that these cases do not reflect institutional sensi-
tivity so much as sensitivity to the fact that the perceptions, capacities and
needs of children are not the same as those of young adults. This differ-
ence is real but, nevertheless, it is better to read these cases as relying on
more than observations about child development. In the schools-and-re-
ligion cases, it is not just that primary and secondary schools are regarded
as places where a certain kind of person-a child-happens to be. More
important in these cases are the arguments and assumptions about the
71. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). I have discussed, in some detail, the role that religion's "divisiveness" has
played in the Court's First Amendment decisions and in the work of some com-
mentators. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amend-
ment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006) (discussing interaction of religion and First
Amendment jurisprudence).
72. Courts and legal doctrines have also distinguished religiously-affiliated
schools that are "pervasively sectarian" from those that are not. Cf Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) ("[T]he inquiry into the recipient's religious
views required by a focus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only
unnecessary but also offensive.").
73. Compare, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (finding tui-
tion assistance program did not violate Establishment Clause), with, e.g., Comm.
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating
state law that provided financial assistance to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools).
74. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding program involv-
ing issuance of bonds that would benefit Baptist college); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (finding Act, authorizing grants to colleges and universities, in-
cluding church-related schools, did not violate Religion Clauses).
75. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) ("[T]here are height-
ened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pres-
sure in the elementary and secondary public schools ... [and] prayer exercises in
public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion."); Chaudhuri v. Tennes-
see, 130 F.3d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that First Amendment did not
prohibit nonsectarian prayers or moments of silence at public functions at Tennes-
see State University). But see Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2003)
(invaliding traditional supper prayer at Virginia Military Institute).
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nature and function of the institutions themselves, and about the pre-
dicted effect of government funding on the purpose of those institutions.
Another way in which the law dealing with religious freedom is sensi-
tive to the special needs of different institutions is through the so-called
"ministerial exception." Religious institutions enjoy what is widely re-
garded as a license to discriminate. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows
religious organizations to engage in otherwise unlawful religious discrimi-
nation7 6 and a judge-made, though apparently constitutionally grounded,
rule prevents courts from applying anti-discrimination laws to such organi-
zations' hiring and firing decisions regarding ministers. 77 These exemp-
tions are widely accepted, even if there are disagreements about their
shape and application.
78
But, why? That is, why are churches allowed to engage in what would
otherwise be illegal discrimination in their dealings with ministers?79 If it
would be illegal for Wal-Mart to fire a store manager because of her gen-
der, then why should a religiously affiliated university be permitted to fire
a chaplain because of hers?80 Or, to borrow an example discussed by
Professors Eisgruber and Sager in their recent and important book,8 1 why
should anti-discrimination law not reach the refusal-or, more precisely,
76. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30
(1987) (exempting religious organizations' secular activities from Title VII prohi-
bition on religious discrimination).
77. See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc. 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.
2007).
The ministerial exception, a doctrine rooted in the First Amendment's
guarantees of religious freedom, precludes subject matter jurisdiction
over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministerial employees, based on the institution's consti-
tutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of
those employees.
Id. at 225.
78. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2007) (" [M] ost people-including many who
lament these discriminatory practices-believe that church policies about clergy
should be constitutionally exempt from anti-discrimination statutes."). But cf
MARci A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)
(arguing religious institutions should be subject to rule of law); Diana B. Hen-
riques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at Al.
79. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1169, 1181
(2007) (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2005)) ("[B]y judicial interpretation, religious organizations may
hire and fire their clergy and similar religious leaders on any criteria they choose;
courts will not entertain lawsuits alleging discrimination of any kind."). See gener-
ally Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-05 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing
"ministerial exception").
80. See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 307-08 (noting rationale for permitting such dis-
crimination in ministerial setting).
81. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 78.
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the asserted inability8 2-of the Roman Catholic Church to ordain women
as priests? Now, for Eisgruber and Sager, the ministerial exception is not
the implication or requirement of the law's special cognizance of religious
institutions. For them, churches' liberty to discriminate when selecting
ministers does not reflect churches' or religion's special status. Instead,
this liberty is rooted in "constitutional values of autonomy and freedom of
association that run to the benefit of all members of our constitutional
community."83 Although indicating dissatisfaction with the Court's rea-
soning in the Boy Scouts case, 84 they nevertheless invoke that decision as
providing a basis for churches' right to discriminate, a right that they re-
gard as flowing from the not-religion-specific constitutional principle that
"there are a variety of personal relationships in which members of our
political community are free to choose their partners, associates, or col-
leagues without interference from the state": "[C]ontemporary constitu-
tional law endorses associational freedom [and] the constitutional
immunity of the Catholic church from equal employment opportunity
mandates in the choice of priests can readily be explained as an instance
of that freedom."85
We should ask whether it is enough-that is, whether it captures all
that we want to say about the freedom of religious institutions to make
decisions about training and ordaining ministers and about the power of
governments to oversee and regulate these decisions-to treat the Roman
Catholic Church like the Boy Scouts.8 6 Several reviewers-while expres-
sing great admiration for their project-have expressed doubts about this
aspect of the Eisgruber and Sager approach. 87 I share these doubts.8 8 Re-
ligious institutions are more than "voluntary association [s] with a cause. '8 9
82. See generally Pope John Paul II, Ordinatio sacerdotalis (1994), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/apost-letters/documents/hfjp-
ii-apl_22051994_ordinatio-sacerdotalisen.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
83. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 78, at 63.
84. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
85. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 78, at 65.
86. Cf Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Entities, supra note 5, at 50 (noting that "[t]he
task of any overarching theory of the constitutional status of religious entities is to
identify and elaborate the reasons, if any, that justify treatment of religious enter-
prises different from secular organizations and from individual believers").
87. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected As Equality?, 85
TEX. L. REv. 1185, 1204-11 (2007) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAW-
RENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007)); Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, The Limits of Equal Liberty as a Theory of Religious Freedom, 85
TEX. L. REv. 1247, 1267-72 (2007) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAW-
RENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007)).
88. Richard W. Garnett, Free to Believe, FIRST THINGS, May 2007, at 39, 43.
89. George Weigel, Papacy and Power, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 2001, at 18, 25; see
also Russell Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, Religious Liberty, and Ecclesiastical Self-Gov-
ernment, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1035, 1053 (2000) ("What was most important [for
the Church in the modem world] was that the Church could be differentiated
without reducing itself to the status of other private associations.").
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Other examples could be offered of ways in which the doctrine used
to implement the Religion Clauses and the theory used to understand
them are, if not entirely sensitive, then at least not quite "agnostic" institu-
tionally. The question is not so much whether or not the doctrine ever
takes account of institutional distinctions as whether or not it does so in
the right way, to the right extent, and for the right reasons.
IV.
An appropriately institutional approach to the Religion Clauses could
have a number of different dimensions. We might ask, for example,
whether our legal doctrine relating to religious freedom under law should
vary with the institutional character of the government entity whose ac-
tions are at issue. "The government," after all, acts through many agents
and parts that are charged with many different tasks, vested with varying
degrees of discretion and constrained in different ways through different
means. Is it realistic-that is, does it capture and translate reality-to treat
all these parts' and agents' acts as the same thing, that is, "state action"?
It is nothing new or controversial, of course, to note that the Religion
Clauses, as originally ratified, did not speak to state and local govern-
ments, but only to "Congress."90 It was "Congress" that could not violate
the "free exercise" of "religion" or make a law respecting its "establish-
ment." Today, though, it is "constitutional bedrock" that the Religion
Clauses constrain the actions of all three branches of the national govern-
ment-not just Congress-and of all state and local government offi-
cials.9 1 Furthermore, these provisions have, it appears, the same binding
content 92 whether the government actor in question works for a city,
town, village, country, state, executive agency, legislature or federal court.
Should they?
90. See, e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); see also Akhil
Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1, 3
(1996) ("The key point is not simply that, as with the rest of the First Amendment,
the Establishment Clause limits only Congress and not the states. That point is
obvious on the face of the Amendment and is confirmed by its legislative
history.").
91. See Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality
Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 663, 666 (2001).
92. Cf Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 51 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would welcome the opportunity to consider more
fully the difficult questions whether and how the Establishment Clause applies
against the States."); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing "difficult question" of "[w]hether and how
[the Establishment] Clause should constrain state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment" and suggesting that "in the context of the Establishment Clause, it
may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar
actions by the Federal Government.").
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The point here is not to wade into the "incorporation" debate.93 It is,
instead, to ask whether, even if we assume that the Religion Clauses regu-
late all government action, they might nevertheless do so in different ways,
or to a different extent, depending on the institutional character of the
official actor or entity involved. Professor Schragger has observed:
[although m]uch of the Supreme Court's modern Religion
Clause doctrine has been forged in conflicts that directly impli-
cate the traditional powers of local governments[ ] . . . [,]
[c]onstitutional theorists have rarely treated this jurisdictional
fact as significant because the post-incorporation Court has never
made a distinction among levels of government when consider-
ing Establishment or Free Exercise Clause challenges.9 4
Perhaps, however, such a distinction should be drawn-and could be
drawn, without undermining fundamental commitments-because it
would better capture an important feature of the pre-doctrinal reality that
the Constitution's doctrines should reflect.
Additionally, a less institutionally agnostic understanding of the Relig-
ion Clauses could take account not only of the institutional context of the
government actor, but also of the institutional context of the government
action. That is, an institutional approach might ask the "where?" question,
as well as the "who?" question, differently.9 5 Does the Free Exercise
Clause require an exemption for religiously motivated conduct from a
generally applicable law? This is the paradigmatic Free Exercise Clause
problem.9 6 Should its solution depend not only on the "general applica-
bility" of the law, or on the existence of a "burden" on an individual's
93. It appears to be settled law that the Establishment Clause has been incor-
porated against the states, notwithstanding the fact that the Establishment Clause
would seem particularly unsuited for incorporation. See, e.g., Amar, Some Notes,
supra note 90, at 3 ("[T]he nature of the states' establishment clause right against
federal disestablishment makes it quite awkward to mechanically 'incorporate' the
clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.").
94. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of
Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1810, 1811 (2004). Schragger noted that consti-
tutional theorists have rarely treated "locational fact[s] as significant" in Religion
Clause cases and contended that "the predominantly local character of Religion
Clause disputes should have theoretical and doctrinal significance." Id. at 1813; cf.
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006);
Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21
J.L. & POL. 147 (2005) (arguing for localist approach to Equal Protection Clause);
Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1624, 1624, 1627-28 (2006) (contending Takings
Clause could apply differently to local governments than to state governments and
national government).
95. Cf., e.g., Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 439, 440 (2006) (arguing that "[i]n terms of the First Amend-
ment, 'place' is dramatically undertheorized").
96. See generally Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 1 (2000). Michael McConnell has noted that:
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"religion," but also on the institutional context-the place, physical or
"metaphysical"9 7
-of the religiously motivated conduct? On the Establish-
ment Clause side, the signature questions include whether a particular
public display of a religious symbol, 9 8 or a particular disbursement of pub-
lic funds for the amelioration of a social problem,99 is an unconstitutional
endorsement or establishment of religion. Should the resolution of these
questions depend, at all, on the particular institutional space or context in
which the symbol is displayed or the funds are spent?10 0
Probably the most obvious way in which constitutional law might take
on board a more institution-sensitive understanding of the Religion
Clauses would be to focus more closely on the religious freedom of relig-
ious institutions, associations, groups and communities. 10 ' It is not new to
observe that American judicial decisions and public conversations about
religious freedom tend to focus on matters of individuals' rights, beliefs,
consciences and practices. 10 2 The special place, role and freedoms of
groups, associations and institutions are often overlooked. 10 3 To be sure,
it is quite clear that such entities have First Amendment rights, if only in
the sense that they are capable of being plaintiffs in free-exercise and non-
From the earliest days of the Republic, Americans have been debating
whether the principle of free exercise entitles religious institutions or re-
ligiously motivated individuals to exemptions from generally applicable
laws, or to other accommodations in order to alleviate the occasional con-
flict between the demands of faith and the demands of the state.
Id.
97. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
830 (1995) (noting that "forum" at issue was "forum more in a metaphysical than
in a spatial or geographic sense ....").
98. See generally McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
99. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
100. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 599 (noting that creche display at
issue "sits on the Grand Staircase, the 'main' and 'most beautiful part' of the build-
ing that is the seat of county government").
101. I have discussed this matter in more detail in some of my other works.
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, 52 VILL. L. REv.
281 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like
the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGA.L COMMENT. 515 (2007); Richard W. Garnett,
The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 59 (2007).
102. See generally, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exer-
cise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633 (2004).
103. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Mary Ann Glendon on Religious Liberty: The
Social Nature of the Person and the Public Nature of Religion, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1191, 1196 (1998) (noting that, for Glendon, "privatization of the function of re-
ligious communities ... perpetuates a legal concept of privatized religion that fails
to describe and protect the widespread reality of public religion."); Gerard V.
Bradley, Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order, 49 LA. L. REv.
1057, 1064 (1987) (noting that the idea of "church autonomy" sits uneasily in our
law and discourse about religious freedom, because of our "longstanding blind
spot.., concerning groups of all kinds").
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establishment lawsuits.10 4 In Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church,10 5 for example, the Justices held that Georgia's civil courts lacked
the power to "determine ecclesiastical questions"-such as the question
whether the Presbyterian Church in the United States had abandoned its
"original tenets and doctrines"-and invoked, in support of this conclu-
sion, the "spirit of freedom for religious organizations" that animates the
First Amendment. 10 6 And, in Amosl 07 -a case involving an exemption
from Title VII's ban on religious discrimination-Justice Brennan empha-
sized, in his concurring opinion, the "rights of religious organizations"
and these organizations' "interest in autonomy in ordering their internal
affairs." 10 8 Religious institutions, he insisted, are "organic entit[ies]" and
are "not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals."' 0 9
It would be possible to go on and on, deepening and shoring up the
point that religious institutions, like religious believers, do and should en-
joy free-exercise rights as well as a measure of autonomy and indepen-
dence, rooted in both the free-exercise and non-establishment
requirements. Many of the very best church-state scholars have explored
in careful detail the content and contours of these institutions' rights as
well as the theoretical and normative bases for their freedoms and immu-
nities.110 On the other hand, as I have noted elsewhere, there is reason
for concern about the contemporary vulnerability of religious institutions'
freedom and autonomy with respect to matters of internal polity. "[T]he
preservation," I have suggested, "of the churches' moral and legal right to
104. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. and Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 343 U.S. 972 (1952).
105. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Pres-
byterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). For a more detailed discussion of this case,
see Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the Develop-
ment of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1645 (2004).
106. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 445-46, 443,
448 (noting preference for excluding religious questions from courts); see also, e.g.,
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871) ("It is of the essence of these religious
unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising
among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiasti-
cal cognizance[.]").
107. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
108. Id. at 340, 341 (Brennan, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 342 (citing, inter alia, Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983)).
110. See, e.g.,JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 139-54 (1996); Brad-
ley, Forum Juridicum, supra note 103; Brady, supra note 102; Carl H. Esbeck, The
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IowA L. REv. 1
(1998); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious
Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987);
Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Entities, supra note 5.
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govern themselves in accord with their own norms and in response to
their own calling is our day's most pressing religious freedom chal-
lenge." 'l An appreciation for the rights and independence of religious
institutions, and an account of the implications of these rights for the fi-
nancial, regulatory, cooperative and other relations between religious and
governmental institutions, is a crucial component of any attractive account
of the Religion Clauses.
All that said, a focus on what Professor Balkin calls the "infrastruc-
ture" of religious freedom,1 1 2 and on the place of religious institutions in
that infrastructure, might pull the discussion away from these "institu-
tional" questions, and push it in a slightly different and perhaps less ex-
plored direction. Yes, an appropriately institutional approach to the
Religion Clauses would involve attention to the religious-freedom rights of
religious entities, and to the significance for free-exercise and non-estab-
lishment cases of institutional context or the institutional character of the
relevant state actors. However, one taking such an approach might also
want to ask whether religious institutions-healthy, independent, free, di-
verse institutions-are not also among the necessary conditions for every-
one else's religious freedom. If it is true that, say, newspapers and
universities not only exercise the freedom of expression but also make its
full exercise and flourishing possible for others, 113 by helping to generate
that which freedom's exercise and flourishing require, then perhaps it is
also true that churches and parochial schools do likewise.
V.
The title of this Essay is "towards an institutional understanding of the
Religion Clauses," and perhaps this title provides some cover for not pur-
porting to complete the journey to such an understanding. Here is the
basic shape of the discussion so far: Institutions matter, in a special way, to
the First Amendment and to the enterprise of enforcing and interpreting
it. Some institutions, we might think, are "First Amendment" institu-
tions-universities, political parties, expressive associations, newspapers,
etc. To say this is certainly not to say that other speakers or institutions are
unprotected or unworthy. It is to say, instead, that our free-speech doc-
trines and categories might do a better job of what we want them to do-
capturing, translating, filtering-if they take institutions, and particularly
these institutions, into account. Religious institutions, too, should simi-
larly be regarded as "First Amendment" institutions, institutions that are
111. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom, supra note 60, at 521. For a very
different view see Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy
Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-up, 29 CARDozo L. REv. 225
(2007) (critiquing church autonomy theory).
112. See Balkin, Infrastructure, supra note 3 (defending existence of infra-
structure of religious freedom).
113. See, e.g., Horwitz, Universities, supra note 1, at 1497 (urging importance
"First Amendment institutions" in First Amendment doctrine).
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not reducible to the rights and interests of their members and employees.
If newspapers and universities matter, in a special way, for the meaning
and values of the Free Speech Clause, and if we suspect that it makes sense
for free-speech doctrine and categories to not be blind to the contours of
these institutions, then perhaps the same thing is true with respect to the
Religion Clauses.
The history of these provisions is famously contested. Their aims are
multiple.' 1 4 Some seem clear, others seem obscure. It is far from obvious
what the Religion Clauses were understood to do, in terms of constraining
the national government, let alone the states, and it is not clear what it
should mean for us today. Even those of us who are sympathetic to the
view that constitutional provisions should be understood and applied, to
the extent possible, in accord with their original public meaning have to
admit that the Religion Clauses serve as vehicles for the construction and
implementation of one or another political theories about the nature and
value of religious freedom and the appropriate relations between religious
and political authority and institutions.
Even so, the implementation, application, interpretation and enforce-
ment of these Clauses are going to involve the development and deploy-
ment of categories, doctrines and abstractions. And, the claims developed
in the context of the Free Speech Clause, with respect to the need for
institution-sensitive doctrine, apply in the Religion Clauses context as well.
Indeed, it could be that the Supreme Court's Religion Clauses doctrine is
famously confused and confusing, not because religion is inherently "divi-
sive," not because scholars disagree about the content and relevance of the
First Amendment's original meaning, and not because that doctrine is the
product of changing groups of judges, appointed by Presidents of differ-
ent parties, with a range of values and commitments. Instead, it could be
that our constitutional doctrine and our thinking about religious freedom
under law do not reflect, capture and translate very well the importance of
particular institutions in the constitutional order and to the values that the
First Amendment should serve. 115
This Essay's "institutional," or "infrastructural," proposal is that the
values and goods that the First Amendment's Religion Clauses are today
understood to embody and protect-and, we might usefully refer to this
cluster of goods and values as "religious freedom"-are well served by a
civil-society landscape that is thick with churches (and other religious insti-
tutions and associations), and by legal rules that acknowledge and capture
their importance. These institutions contribute to-they do not only ben-
114. See generally JOHN WrrTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL EXPERIMENT (2d ed. 2005).
115. My colleague, Paolo Carozza, observed to me that this feature of our
religious-freedom doctrines might reflect, or resemble, more generally, a weakness
of fights-based approaches to questions of freedom and the common good. See
generally, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF MORAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
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efit from, and they are not only protected by-the reality of religious free-
dom under law. Just as the "[fireedom of speech ...depends on an
infrastructure of free expression," 116 the freedom of religion depends on
an infrastructure of, well, religious freedom. Part of this infrastructure-
in addition to its more obvious components, like open and functioning
courts, legal accommodations, thriving communications networks, etc.-is
a web of independent, thriving, distinctive institutions.
How, exactly, do churches (and the like) shore up (and not just find
shelter within) the freedom of religion? It is clearly not by supplanting
the freedom of the individual religious conscience as the ultimate benefi-
ciary of religious freedom under law. Quite the contrary. As I have
spelled out in more detail elsewhere, 117 the existence and independence
of religious institutions-and specifically, of the Church-long served,
and is still needed today, as the "social armature to the sacred order,"
within which the individual human person could be "secure in all the free-
doms that his sacredness demands." 118
Obviously, the days are long gone when we could speak of the Church
as the chief rival to, check upon and sometimes close partner with the
State. Today, in our religious-freedom doctrines and conversations, it is
likely that the independence and autonomy of churches, and of religious
institutions and associations generally are seen as deriving from the free-
exercise or conscience rights of individual persons rather than as provid-
ing the basis for the exercise of those rights. (Indeed, many would say,
and perhaps celebrate the fact, that institutions are becoming less impor-
tant to our religious, or "spiritual," lives. 119 ) It remains the case, though,
that the existence and independence of religious institutions-self-defin-
ing, self-governing, self-directing institutions-are needed, as John
Courtney Murray put it, to "check the encroachments of secular power
and preserve [the] immunities" of our "basic human things."1 20 Murray
was right to worry that the individual conscience, standing alone, is not up
to the task of creating and sustaining the conditions necessary to ensure
religious freedom; it is not, as he put it, "equal to the burden" of serving as
the "sole authentic mediator of moral imperatives to the political order"
and the "keystone of the modern experiment in freedom. 1 2 1 An institu-
tional approach to the Religion Clauses would recognize this worry, and
have responding to it as its chief aim.
116. Balkin, Two Ideas for Access to Knowledge, supra note 2.
117. See, e.g., Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, supra note 101 (discussing
interaction between individual conscience and freedom of religion).
118. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLEC-
TIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 204, 205 (1988).
119. See, e.g., ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION:
How WE AcTU anL LwE OUR FAITH (2003); see also, Garnett, Assimilation, supra
note 105, 1662-65 (discussing Wolfe's claims regarding developments in Ameri-
cans' religious views).
120. MURRAY, supra note 118, at 204.
121. Id. at 213.
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